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PUTTING THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
KENT C. KRAUSE*
RIOR TO THE September 11, 2001 planned suicide hijack-
ings of four airliners, hijackings had been the result of hos-
tage-related terrorist attacks or a demented individual bent on
some misguided cause. The shift of terrorist tactics on Septem-
ber 11 spurred the passage of aggressive and comprehensive leg-
islation in aviation security.' But even before that now infamous
date, aviation security, on paper at least, was a highly regulated
area of transportation law.2 Federal laws and regulations gener-
ally covered airport security,' airplane operator security, 4 and in-
direct air carrier security.5
* Mr. Krause is a Texas-licensed attorney with the aviation law firm of Speiser
Krause, a Professional Corporation, co-author of a three volume work entitled
Aviation Tort and Regulatory Law (West Group), past Chair of the State Bar of
Texas Aviation Law Section, and an Adjunct Professor of Aviation Law at
Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law in Dallas, Texas.
I Congress and the President have advanced several new laws under the aus-
pices of homeland security to reduce terrorism threats that are not directly re-
lated to aviation. While beyond the scope of this article, some of the other
considered legislation includes the Homeland Security Act, the USA Patriot Act,
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act.
2 See 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (2002); 14 C.F.R. §§ 107-109 (2002). Airline anti-hi-
jacking security requirements, including the screening of passengers and bag-
gage, originated as and have remained an aspect of federal, rather than state,
governmental regulation. See Wagner v. Metro. Nashville Airport Auth., 772 F.2d
227, 230 & n.2 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir.
1973). It appears that no state has attempted to set standards for airline security
after the establishment of the federal anti-hijacking program. See also 49 U.S.C.
§ 44903(b) (3) (2002) (requiring "a uniform procedure for searching and detain-
ing passengers and property").
3 14 C.F.R. §§ 107, 139.
4 14 C.F.R. § 108.
5 14 C.F.R. § 109.
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. IN GENERAL
Through the Federal Aviation Act in 1958,6 Congress estab-
lished the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and thus,
centralized rulemaking for United States air transportation.
The FAA in turn was empowered to promulgate Federal Avia-
tion Regulations (FARs) 7 "to protect passengers and property
on an aircraft" from acts "of criminal violence or aircraft
piracy,"8 and to establish, "to the maximum extent practica-
ble... a uniform procedure for searching and detaining passen-
gers and property."9
The FARs required each airplane operator to adopt a
mandatory Air Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP) to
address a number of security requirements, including proce-
dures for screening passengers and property. The airplane op-
erator had to submit its ACSSP to the FAA for approval. 10 The
FARs also required airport operators to adopt security pro-
grams, to be approved by the FAA, providing for control of ac-
cess to operations areas and necessary law enforcement
support. 1
The rash of air carrier hijackings in the 1960's and 1970's cre-
ated the impetus for a number of security measures.' 2 While
certainly some security measures existed prior to the hijackings
of the late 1960's, the hijackings significantly transformed air
transportation security requirements; these standards remained
in effect with only minor changes until the events of September
11.13 The FAA has long regulated passenger screening,14 bag-
6 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2002). See, e.g, Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d
892, 894 (2d Cir. 1960) (recognizing that Congress passed the Federal Aviation
Act to centralize "in a single authority the power to frame rules for the safe and
efficient use of the nation's airspace").
7 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (a)(1)-(3); 49 U.S.C. § 40113 (2002).
49 U.S.C. § 44903(b) (2002).
9 49 U.S.C. § 44903(b) (3).
10 14 C.F.R. § 108.25 (2001).
1i See 14 C.F.R. § 107.5 (2001).
12 See Davis, 482 F.2d at 893.
13 Congress bolstered the initial dictates of the Federal Aviation Act by passing
the Antihijacking Act of 1974 as codified in 49 U.S.C. §§ 46501, 44901; Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990 as codified throughout 49 U.S.C. § 44901; see
also United States v. Fannon, 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977). Ironically, after sev-
eral years of consideration and study, the FAA issued in July 2001, final rules
substantially rewriting Parts 107 and 139 (Airport Security) and 108 (Aircraft Op-
erator Security).
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gage screening,5 limiting airport access," and air freight
screening.' 7 The FAA found a partner in aviation safety when
the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 199018 directed the
FAA to work with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to identify
and assess current and potential threats to the air transportation
system.' 9 The 1990 Act required the agencies to identify and
continually monitor parties capable of and intending to commit
terrorist acts against the air transportation system, and to devise
methods to improve aviation security to thwart these threats.2 °
The events of September 11 and the subsequent critical analysis
of the intelligence and security failings of that day, show a break-
down in the implementation and follow through of communica-
tions and measures necessary to fulfil the intent of the 1990 Act,
not only between the FBI and the FAA, but even within the FBI
itself.21
Pre-September 11, the then-existing regulatory scheme placed
the responsibility of formulating and implementing security
strategy principally upon the airlines and airport operators
22
and relied heavily on the industry to fund, administer, and over-
see all aspects of air carrier security.23 In a fiercely competitive
14 14 C.F.R. § 108.9; see also In re Northwest Airlines, Inc., Civil Penalty Decision
1998-22, 5 FAD CP-1369 (F.A.A. 1998).
15 14 C.F.R. §§ 108.9, 108.13, 108.17, 108.20.
16 14 C.F.R. § 107.13; see also In re Airport Operator, Civil Penalty Decision
1996-1, 5 FAD CP-625 (F.A.A. 1996); Detroit Metropolitan-Wayne County Airport,
Civil Penalty Decision 1997-23, 5 FAD (F.A.A. 1997).
17 14 C.F.R. § 109.3.
18 Codified throughout 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (2002).
19 49 U.S.C. § 44904 (2002).
20 See also 49 U.S.C. § 44912.
21 See, e.g., Kenneth Williams: Man of the Memo, at http://www.time.com (last
visited May 5, 2003); FBI agent slams HQ 'Bureaucracy,' at http://www.wash
times.com (last visited May 5, 2003); FBI knows pilots training in US, at http://
www.onenews.nzoom.com/onenews..detail/0,1227,134092-1-9,00.html (last vis-
ited May 5, 2003); FBI aware terrorists in training; agents visited U.S. flight
schools several times, at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/
texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=training23&date-20 0 10923 (last visited May 5,
2003).
22 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.3, 108.5, 109.3; see also Atlantic Coast Airlines, Civil
Penalty Decision 2000-6, FAD CP-1650 (F.A.A. 2000); Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
Civil Penalty Decision 1999-12, FAD CP-1497 (F.A.A. 1999); Am. Airlines, Inc.,
Civil Penalty Decision 1999-1, FAD CP-1405 (F.A.A. 1999); Northwest Airlines,
Inc., Civil Penalty Decision 1998-22, 5 FAD CP-1369 (F.A.A. 1998); City of Los
Angeles, Dep't of Airports, Civil Penalty Decision 1998-7, FAD CP-1248 (F.A.A.
1998); Air Carrier, Civil Penalty Decision 1996-19, 5 FAD CP-777 (F.A.A. 1996).
23 See, e.g., DOT, Study and Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security Re-
sponsibilities and Funding, at 9-14 (1998) available at http://www.tsa.gov/inter
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marketplace, the airlines and airport operators were conflicted
between the interests of passenger comfort and convenience,
their own need for cost cutting, and the desire for truly effective
security measures.24
B. AIR PIRACY AND OTHER AIRBORNE CRIMES
Regrettably, air piracy and other airborne crimes have existed
almost as long as 'commercial aviation. The first reported in-
stance of air piracy occurred in Peru in 1931.25 Reportedly,
more than 1,000 hijackings have occurred worldwide since the
late 1940's, when the era of commercial airliner hijackings be-
gan in earnest with an attempt to gain control of a Cathay Pa-
cific seaplane near Macao. 26 The criminality of such actions is
not a new concept either.27 Congress first addressed air piracy
and other airborne crimes in 1961 by amending the Federal Avi-
ation Act of 1958 to establish air piracy as a federal crime.25
Over time, Congress also criminalized interference with flight
crewmembers and attendants, 29 carrying a weapon or explosive
on an aircraft, 0 and providing false information and threats."
web/assetlibrary/Study-andReport toCongress onCivilAviationSecurity_
Responsibilities-andFunding_1998.pdf (last visited May 5, 2003):
The FAA is responsible for establishing and enforcing regulations,
policies and procedures; identifying potential threats and appropri-
ate countermeasures; deploying Federal Air Marshals on selected
U.S. air carrier flights; and providing overall guidance to ensure
the security of passengers, crew, baggage, cargo, and aircraft....
Air carriers bear the primary responsibility for applying security
measures to passengers, service and flight crews, baggage, and
cargo. Airports run by State or local government authorities are re-
sponsible for maintaining a secure ground environment and for
providing law enforcement support for implementation of airline
and airport security measures.
24 Poole & Butler, Fixing Airport Security 21st Century Strategies for 21st Century
Threats, at http://www.rppi.org (Sept. 21, 2001). See, e.g., Aviation Security: FAA's
Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding for Airport Security and to Certify
Screening Companies, at http://www.gao.gov/airptsec.html (Feb. 25, 1999); Avi-
ation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for Assigning Screen-
ing Responsibilities, at http://www.gao.gov/airptsec.html (Sept. 21, 2001).
25 See Britannica Concise Encyclopedia 2003, Hijacking, at http://www.britan-
ica.com/ebc/article?eu=392399 (last visited May 5, 2003).
26 See Wikipedia On-Line Encyclopedia, Aircraft Hijacking, at http://wikipedia.
org/wiki/aircraft.hijacking (last visited May 5, 2003).
27 49 U.S.C. § 46501 (2002).
28 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (2002).
29 49 U.S.C. § 46504 (2002).
30 49 U.S.C. § 46505 (2002).
31 49 U.S.C. § 46507 (2002).
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Further, it extended the application of certain other criminal
laws to aircraft.12
These significant alterations to aviation security were neces-
sary to respond to the rash of hijackings in the late 1960's and
early 1970's. From 1968 to 1970 there were nearly 200 hijack-
ings worldwide. 3  The hijackings typically were instigated to cap-
ture aircraft or passengers as hostages for the advancement of
some notorious cause. The late 1960's ushered in the modern
era of international terrorist hijackings when members of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked an El Al
airliner from Rome and forced it to fly to Algeria. The passen-
gers were held for 40 days before being released.
Further examples of this traditional hijacking and hostage
pattern extended into the 1970's. In 1970, planes of Pan Am,
TWA, and Swiss Air were hijacked and were forced to fly to the
Jordanian desert. 4 Four hundred people were on board the
planes, but all were eventually released in exchange for the re-
lease of Palestinian prisoners. In 1973, Palestinian terrorists
hurled hand grenades and fired bullets into a line of passengers
waiting in Rome, Italy to board a Pan Am flight bound for New
York, killing thirty and injuring fifty-five. 3 5 An Air France air-
liner was hijacked in 1976 and forced to land at Entebbe Airport
in Uganda. The historic Raid on Entebbe ensued when Israeli
commandos freed 105 passengers. Three passengers, one Israeli
commando, and all the hijackers were killed in the operation.3
A Lufthansa airliner was hijacked in 1977 and forced to land in
Mogadishu, Somalia. At the end of a five-day stand off, the hi-
jackers had killed the plane's pilot, but released eighty-six other
unharmed hostages.
The 1980's witnessed even deadlier hijackings. In 1981, a Pa-
kistan International Airlinesjet was hijacked and taken to Kabul,
Afghanistan and then Damascus, Syria. The hijackers killed one
passenger, but released the others when the Pakistani Govern-
ment agreed to free more than fifty political prisoners. Hijack-
32 49 U.S.C. § 46506 (2002).
33 See Britannica Concise Encyclopedia 2003, Hijacking, at http://www.britan-
ica.com/ebc/article?eu=392399 (last visited May 5, 2003).
34 History Central.com, at http://www.multied.com/terrorhistory.html (last
visited May 5, 2003).
35 Airsafe.com, at http://www.airsafe.com/events/hijack.htm (last visited May
5, 2003).
36 History Central.com, at http://www.multied.com/terrorhistory.html (last
visited May 5, 2003).
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ers armed with pistols, explosives, and other weapons tortured
four American passengers and eventually killed two of them,
when in 1984 a Kuwait Airways flight to Pakistan was hijacked
and flown to Tehran, Iran. The year 1985 saw three lethal
hijackings: (1) a bomb in the forward cargo hold exploded in an
Air India Boeing 747 en route to Bombay, India, from Toronto,
Canada, killing all 329 people on board;37 (2) a TWA flight to
Athens, Greece, was hijacked and diverted to Beirut, where after
seventeen-days one passenger was killed before the remaining
passengers and crew were released; and (3) terrorists seized an
Egypt Air aircraft and diverted it to Malta, where they began
executing American and Israeli passengers.3 8 Hijackers also vic-
timized TWA in 1986 when a bomb exploded in one of its Boe-
ing 727s during flight near Athens, Greece, blowing a hole in
the fuselage.3 9 The resulting cabin decompression sucked out
four passengers to their deaths and injured several others. Mi-
raculously, the aircraft landed safely. In 1986, Pan Am Flight 73
was hijacked in Karachi, Pakistan, when hijackers drove a vehicle
onto the tarmac, entered the plane and opened fire on the pas-
sengers, killing twenty-two people and injuring numerous
others. In 1988, terrorists hijacked a Kuwait Airways flight from
Thailand and forced it to fly to Algiers, where, over a sixteen-day
stand-off, two passengers were killed before the remaining hos-
tages were freed and the hijackers surrendered.4" Libyan ter-
rorists planted a bomb in Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 that
exploded mid-air near Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 peo-
ple on board and eleven people on the ground.4 In 1989, a
bomb exploded in a French UTA DC-10 over Niger in the
Tenere Desert, killing all 171 people on board.
The 1990's saw a reduction in the number of hijackings and
related deaths, but by no means were they eliminated. In 1993,
hijackers seized an Ethiopian Airlines plane in eastern Ethiopia,
killing one passenger. An Air France A300 was hijacked in Al-
37 Airsafe.com, at http://airsafe.com/events/airlines/ain.htm (last visited May
5, 2003).
38 Airsafe.com, at http://www.airsafe.com/events/airlines/egyptair.htm (last
visited May 5, 2003).
39 Airsafe.com, at http://www.airsafe.com/events/airlines/twa.htm (last vis-
ited May 5, 2003).
40 Airsafe.com, at http://www.airsafe.com/events/airlines/kuwait.htm (last
visited May 5, 2003).
41 History Central.com, at http://www.multied.com/terrorhistory.html (last
visited May 5, 2003); Airsafe.com, at http://airsafe.com/events/mostfat.htm (last
visited May 5, 2003).
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giers in December of 1994. The four hijackers killed three pas-
sengers and then they in turn were killed when commandos
retook the aircraft.4 2 In 1996, three hijackers seized an Ethio-
pian Airlines Boeing 767 in Kenyan airspace demanding to go to
Australia, only to run out of fuel, and crash in the Indian Ocean
off the Comoros Islands, killing 125 of the 175 on board.4"
Pakistani commandos, in 1998, overpowered and arrested three
hijackers of a Pakistan International Airlines airplane, freeing all
29 passengers. Kashmiri militants hijacked an Indian Airlines
aircraft and forced it to fly to Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1999. A
week long standoff ended when India agreed to release three
jailed Kashmiri militants. 44
During 2000, Afghans seeking to escape the Taliban regime
hijacked a domestic flight with 164 people on board and di-
verted it to Stansted Airport near London where, after a five-day
stand off, the hijackers released all hostages and surrendered to
authorities.45 That same year two Saudi hijackers took control
of a Saudi Arabian Airlines plane to Baghdad, where they sur-
rendered to Iraqi authorities. Lastly, Chechen separatists hi-
jacked a Vnukovo Airlines flight from Istanbul to Moscow in
2001, diverting it to Saudi Arabia. Once there, security forces
initially negotiated the release of 47 passengers, but when fur-
ther negotiations broke down, Saudi commandos stormed the
plane freeing more than 100 passengers and the crew, although
one passenger and a flight attendant were killed.
46
The deadliest terrorist hijacking to date took place in U.S. air-
space. On September 11, 2001, nineteen men, now identified as
foot soldiers of Osama Bin Laden's Al Queda network, hijacked
four planes. They intentionally crashed American Airlines
Flight 11 scheduled from Boston to Los Angeles into the North
Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City, and United
Airlines Flight 175 scheduled from Boston to Los Angeles into
the South Tower of the World Trade Center. Both towers and
some adjacent buildings collapsed within hours. During this at-
42 Airsafe.com, at http://www.airsafe.com/events/airlines/afa.htm (last visited
May 5, 2003).
43 Aviation Safety Network, at http://aviation-safety.net/database/1996/ 9 6 1 1
23-0.htm (last visited May 5, 2003).
44 Airsafe.com, at http://www.airsafe.com/events/airlines/indian.htm (last
visited May 5, 2003).
45 Information Times, Inc., at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/PakistanJour-
nal/message/12 7 7 (last visited Apr. 21, 2003).
46 Peter Tomich, Vnukovo Airlines Hijacking, at http://www.specwarnet.com/
miscinfo/vnukovo.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2003).
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tack, American Airlines flight 77 scheduled from Dulles Interna-
tional to Los Angeles was intentionally crashed into the
Pentagon. United Airlines Flight 93 scheduled from Newark to
San Francisco crashed into a rural area in Stony Creek, Penn-
sylvania, after several passengers overpowered the hijackers
upon learning the fate of the other three planes. Reports esti-
mated that as many as 3,000 people perished in these four at-
tacks. It is now believed that more hijackings were planned, but
were averted when all flights in the U.S. were grounded.
Air piracy has been present almost as long as there has been
commercial air transportation service. The coordinated plot of
multiple, simultaneous hijackings for the purpose of using the
aircraft as fuel-laden guided missiles distinguished the events of
September 11 from prior hijackings. While the methodology
utilized on September 11 was new, the legal framework for ad-
dressing these crimes was not, having developed over time in
step with the growth of commercial air transportation service.
Aircraft piracy is a punishable criminal offense in the United
States.4 7 Federal regulations grant special jurisdiction to en-
force these criminal aircraft piracy laws.4 8 The actual moment
of seizing the aircraft is not determinative of jurisdiction over
the hijackers, so when evidence indicates the unequivocal inten-
tion to hijack the aircraft, the hijacking begins in the jurisdic-
tion where the hijackers boarded the aircraft, rather than in the
jurisdiction where the hijacking demand was made during
flight. 49
Airborne crimes, aside from aircraft piracy, may occur in vari-
ous forms. Criminally punishable prohibitions include interfer-
ence with flight and cabin crew members,5 ° carrying a weapon
or explosive on an aircraft,5' providing false information or
47 49 U.S.C. § 46502.
48 49 U.S.C. § 46501.
49 See, e.g., United States v. Busic, 549 F.2d 252, 259 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding
jurisdiction where the wrongful act began, continued, or was completed for an
air piracy case where the flight originated in the Eastern District of New York and
control of the aircraft occurred somewhere over the Western District of New
York). But see Air Transportation Safety & System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 408, 115 Stat. 230 (2001), wherein Congress mandated special exclusive
jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York for the claims arising from the
September 11, 2001 terrorist acts, including those arising from the Pentagon and
Pennsylvania crashes.
50 49 U.S.C. § 46504.
5' 49 U.S.C. §§ 46505, 46303 (Civil Penalty).
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making threats of dangerous behavior,52 entering an aircraft in
violation of security requirements, 53 and transporting hazardous
material.54 Similarly, actions taken by someone against fellow
passengers will also give rise to criminal prosecution. Appropri-
ate remedies and jurisdiction will be determined by several fac-
tors, including the origin of flight, the location of the offense,
and the destination of the flight.
55
C. AIRPORT SECURITY
An airport operator is responsible for the security of the air
operations area.56 An airport operator fulfills this obligation by
developing, implementing, and operating an approved security
program. 57 Notwithstanding, the airlines have independent re-
sponsibility for the security of their aircraft.5
8
As a consequence of the hijackings of the late 60's and early
70's, security at airports was substantially altered from the then
status quo. In particular, the importance for increased security
and the serious nature of the security procedures implemented
led one court to find that an unloaded gun constitutes a danger-
ous weapon. 59 Another court held that a law prohibiting joking
about or falsely reporting a bomb did not violate First, Fifth and
Sixth Amendment constitutional rights.6" The courts have also
ruled that the use of a magnetometer (metal detector) is a con-
stitutionally reasonable search of one's person and does not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment. 61 Further, the failure to clear
through the magnetometer gives justification to a more physi-
cally intrusive search.6 2 Because the use of the magnetometer
and a subsequent physical search are justified, such search and
seizure is not unreasonable and thus constitutionally sound
where the search is limited in scope to the circumstances that
52 49 U.S.C. §§ 46507, 46302 (Civil Penalty).
53 49 U.S.C. § 46314.
54 49 U.S.C. § 46312.
55 United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
56 14 C.F.R. § 107.13.
57 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.3, 107.5, 107.13; In reAirport Operator, Civil Penalty Deci-
sions 1991-58, 3 FAD CP-180 (F.A.A. 1991).
58 In re Continental Airlines, Civil Penalty Decisions 1990-12, 2 FAD CP-51
(F.A.A. 1990).
59 United States v. Ware, 315 F. Supp. 1333, 1335 (W.D. Okla. 1971).
60 United States v. Feldman, 10 Avi. 18,350 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
61 United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972).
62 United States v. Bell 464 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Lo-
pez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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justified the interference.63 Additionally, the courts have ad-
dressed the parameters within which a person can be consid-
ered to be attempting to board an aircraft with a weapon. 64 The
courts have generally found that when a person checks in by
surrendering his ticket at a customer service desk and entering a
departure lounge in advance of a flight covered by that ticket is
an attempt to board. In today's more strict security with expan-
sive 'sterile' areas allowing ticketed passengers only, any attempt
to enter a secure area likely would be found by the courts to
constitute an attempt to board.65
Profiling is an area the courts have considered before and un-
doubtedly will again in our post-September 11 state of height-
ened security and caution. In aviation security, developing a
profile of potential hijackers has been seriously studied and gen-
erally found to be permissible within the right parameters. The
courts have found that where appropriate statistical, sociological
and psychological data and techniques are utilized to create a
profile whose characteristics are easily observed without discrim-
ination on the basis of religion, origin, political views or race,
then such profiling does not violate due process or equal protec-
tion rights under the Constitution.66 The TSA expects to imple-
ment an updated profiling system using all kinds of data about
buying and traveling habits, including information such as
where a person has traveled and if he or she has had multiple
bank accounts or addresses in recent years. 67
II. AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
A. IN GENERAL
The events of September 11, 2001 revealed an undreamed-of
use of a fully fueled airliner as a suicidal device of mass destruc-
tion by terrorists. New measures of intelligence gathering and
analysis, immigration policy changes, and enhanced security of
the skies, were clearly required. In this same vein, the pre-Sep-
tember l1th methodology for handling hijackings was one of
cooperation in an attempt to secure the safety of the passengers
63 Epperson, 454 F.2d at 771.
64 United States v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Tex. 1969).
65 Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., 298 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2002).
66 See, e.g., Bell, 464 F.2d at 673; Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1086. See also, Press
Release, Department of Justice, No. 355: 06-17-03, Justice Department Issues Policy
Guidance to Ban Racial Profiling, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/
June/.
67 Steve Brill, On Guard, A Year Later, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16, 2002, at 38.
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and crew.68 The advent of the suicide hijacker required a com-
prehensive change to the historical policy of cooperation and
acquiescence.6
In response to the clear and present danger of future terrorist
attacks in the United States, (in addition to the measures imme-
diately undertaken by the FAA), the Aviation and Transporta-
tion Security Act (ATSA) was signed into law on November 16,
2001.70
Congress passed the ATSA to bolster what many perceived as
past security complacency. Prior to September 11, airlines and
passengers were mostly concerned with on-time arrivals and de-
partures. Airlines seldom searched checked baggage, and peo-
ple passed with alarming frequency through security
checkpoints with undetected weapons and false identification.
Passengers boarded flights without paying much attention to the,
people sitting next to them. Most passengers tended to their
own interests, tuning out those around them as well as safety
instructions from flight attendants. Their concerns upon land-
ing were only of waiting for luggage, ground transportation, and
hotel reservations.
After September 11, this complacency disappeared. For many
months, armed military personnel roamed airports. Security
guards, fellow passengers, and flight crews scrutinized everyone.
In one instance, a pilot removed an Arab-American man from a
- On October 3, 2001, Senator Fritz Hollings (S.C.) commented that the in-
flight security plan in effect on September 11 trained flight crews to cooperate
with hijackers:
Heretofore, until September 11, the rule of the game was for the
pilots to say: You want to go to Havana, Cuba? I wanted to go there,
too. Let us all fly to Havana. And you ask the other hijacker: You
want to go to Rio? As soon as we land in Cuba and get some fuel,
we will go to Rio. They will go anywhere they want to accommodate
the hijacker and get the plane on the ground at whatever place he
wants to go and let law enforcement take over.
147 CONG. REc. S10128 (2001).
69 See, e.g., Federal Aviation Security Standards: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce,
Science & Transp. Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Paul Hudson, Execu-
tive Director, Aviation Consumer Action Project) ("Flight crews must be re-
trained to resist rather than cooperate with hijackers. Current training assumes
that hijackers are not determined suicidal fanatics and emphasizes cooperation
with hijackers so as not to unduly upset them.").
70 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
ATSA].
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plane for allegedly suspicious conduct; the man happened to be
a plain-clothes Secret Service agent.7 1
The ATSA responds to this change in atmosphere and broadly
expands the government's control over, and active role in, avia-
tion security. The Act establishes hands-on, full-time federal
control over aviation security through the creation of the Trans-
portation Security Administration. 72 Under the Act, the Presi-
dent appoints an Undersecretary responsible for an
administrative agency overseeing security in all modes of trans-
portation, including air travel.73
A principal edict of the ATSA is the implementation of day-to-
day screening operations of passenger air transportation and
the hiring and training of a national force of security personnel,
as well as the development of hiring and training standards for
that force.7 4 Additionally, the ATSA enables the creation of reg-
ulations governing security measures on aircraft, including the
authority to issue orders improving flight deck security.75 Spe-
cifically, it authorizes the FAA to develop and implement meth-
ods to use video monitors or other devices to alert pilots on the
flight deck to activity in the cabin, insure continuous operation
of an aircraft transponder in the event of an emergency, install
devices that enable flight attendants to notify pilots of security
breaches in the cabin, restrict access to the flight deck, and re-
strict possession of a key to the flight deck to certain airline per-
sonnel.76 While a pilot in command of an aircraft may have
unfettered discretion to determine whether to admit certain
people to the flight deck,7 7 a question remains as to whether
that discretion extends to the cabin aft of the flight deck.78
71 CNN, Pilot, Secret Service Agent Trade Charges (Jan. 5, 2002), at http://www.
cnn.com/law; see alsoJonathan D. Salant, Officials Debate Use of Ethnicity in Profiling
Passengers, MIAMI HERALD, July 5, 2002, at 20A.
72 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101 [hereinafter TSA].
73 49 U.S.C. § 114(d).
74 49 U.S.C. § 114(e).
75 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 104.
76 Id.
77 See Letter from Donald B. Byrne, Assistant Chief Counsel, The Federal Avia-
tion Administration, to Captain David Webb and J. Mark Hansen, Federal Pilots
Association (July 17, 2001); Letter from Donald B. Byrne, Assistant Chief Coun-
sel, The Federal Aviation Administration, to James W. Johnson, Supervisory Attor-
ney, Air Line Pilots Association (Apr. 2, 2002).
78 Cordero v. Cia Mexicana de Aviacion, 681 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1982); Schaffer
v. Cavallero, 54 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b); see also,
Letter from Donald B. Byrne, Assistant Chief Counsel, The Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration, to James W. Johnson, Supervisory Attorney, Air Line Pilots Associa-
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The ATSA also reestablishes the deployment of federal air
marshals and sets forth the requirements for employing and in-
creasing their numbers.79 On September 11, 2002 there were
reportedly only 36 active federal air marshals.8 0 Extensive action
regarding screening of checked baggage has also been imple-
mented by the ATSA.8 ' Also, the ATSA significantly bolsters the
position of Federal Security Manager by requiring the Undersec-
retary to fill and deploy individuals as Federal Security Managers
at all commercial airports in the United States regularly served
by certificated air carriers.8 2
The ATSA authorizes additional action to improve airport pe-
rimeter access security. Heightened security measures include
traditional methods of screening all individuals, goods, prop-
erty, and vehicles before they are permitted in a secured area, as
well as newer methods such as biometeric and other technologi-
cally advanced methods of verifying identity.83
Many ATSA provisions address the need for change from a
policy of cooperation with hijackers and terrorists to one more
suited to combat the suicidal acts of September 11, 2001. Under
the ATSA, existing programs are expanded for research and de-
velopment of methods to understand, anticipate, and respond
to various threats posed by modern terrorists.8 4 The ATSA also
implements new provisions regarding flight school security,8 5 in-
tion (Oct. 17, 2002). One need only look to the recent secret service agent
episode for illustration of the problem. Further, there have been a number of
reported instances post-September 11 of passengers who had satisfactorily
cleared security but who were removed because their appearance made the flight
crew or other passengers uneasy. The repeated occurrence of such removals has
resulted in legal action being initiated in at least one instance by the Department
of Transportation, which took the unprecedented action of bringing an enforce-
ment proceeding and proposed assessment of civil penalties against American
Airlines alleging unlawful discrimination against certain passengers by removing
them from flights or denying boarding because the passengers were, or were per-
ceived to be, of Arab, Middle-Eastern or South Asian descent and/or Muslim. In
re Am. Airlines, Inc., Department of Transportation Enforcement Proceeding,
Docket OST-2203-15046, Apr. 25, 2003.
79 49 U.S.C. § 44917 (2002).
80 MSNBC, Air Marshals Program Hits Turbulence, at http://www.msnbc.com/
news/862756.asp?cv=CB20 (Jan. 23, 2003).
81 49 U.S.C. § 44901.
82 49 U.S.C. § 44933; see also, Carole Hedden, TSA Launches Massive Work Force
Buildup, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 15, 2002, at 46.
83 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 106; 49 U.S.C. § 44903(h); see also, Wayne Rash, Jr.,
Here Comes GA's New Security, PLANE & PILOT, June 2002, at 28.
84 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 112.
85 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 113; 49 U.S.C. § 44939.
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creases penalties for interference with security personnel,86 es-
tablishes new requirements for air carrier passenger manifests,8 7
develops airline computer reservation systems, 88 and imple-
ments a security service fee for funding the mandates provided
for in the ATSA.s 9 Other miscellaneous provisions include the
grant of immunity for encouraging airline employees to report
suspicious activities, 90 consideration of weaponry for flight deck
crews, 91 and the research and development of new security tech-
nology and the assessment and deployment of emerging avia-
tion security technology. 92
The ATSA also amended the Air Transportation Safety & Sys-
tem Stabilization Act,9" broadening the scope of the parties ben-
efiting from the liability limitation provisions of the original
act.94
Commercial airlines are not the only ones affected by the in-
creased security measures. Private and charter aircraft may have
felt an even greater impact.95 Air taxi and charter operations
initially benefited by an increase in business travelers wanting to
avoid increased terminal security. But the initial allure has
faded with new regulations being applied to them, too: soon-to-
be-required fingerprint-based criminal background checks, air-
port and flight restrictions, cockpit security measures, and to
some extent, airline-type passenger and baggage security screen-
ing procedures. 96 Private pilots' access to airports and airspace
86 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 114; 49 U.S.C. § 46503.
87 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 115.
88 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 117.
89 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 118; 49 U.S.C. § 44940.
90 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 125; 49 U.S.C. § 44941.
91 Pub. L. No. 107-71, §§ 126, 128.
92 Pub. L. No. 107-71, §§ 136, 137.
93 Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.).
94 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201. The Air Transportation and System Stabilization
Act originally only limited the liability of the air carriers victimized on September
11. The ATSA broadens those receiving liability relief to include also aircraft
manufacturers, airport sponsors and persons with a property interest in the
World Trade Center.
95 See, e.g., Edward Phillips, Business Aviation Grapples with Ops Impediments, AVIA-
TION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 10, 2001, at 79; John Croft, TSA to Terminate
Hassle-Free Flights, AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 29, 2002, at 44; Edward
Phillips, Security Airport Issues Rankle Business Aviation, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Sept. 9, 2002, at 46.
96 See Wayne Rash, Jr., Here Comes GA's New Security, PLANE & PILOT, June 2002,
at 28; 49 C.F.R. § 1540 Civil Aviation Security: General Rules; 49 C.F.R. § 1550
Aircraft Security Under General Operating and Flight Rules.
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has been restricted at unprecedented levels.9 7 In an effort to
bridge the gap between the TSA's efforts at the 492 public use
airports served by airlines and the more than 1400 general avia-
tion airports in the U.S., the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Associa-
tion (AOPA) partnered with the TSA to develop a nationwide
general aviation airport security program.9" Called the AOPA
Airport Watch, the program enlists pilots to report suspicious
activity that might signify criminal or terrorist threats.
B. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
By far the most ambitious goal of the ATSA was creating the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).99 Originally cre-
ated as an administration of the Department of Transportation,
the Transportation Security Administration was transferred on
March 1, 2003, to the newly created Department of Homeland
Security.1 °° The ATSA contemplates the transfer and consolida-
tion of all transportation-related security activities from various
federal departments under the one roof of the newly created
Transportation Security Administration.1"' The TSA is to over-
see not only aviation, but also other modes of transportation,"0 2
although its initial emphasis has been to address the ATSA di-
rectives about aviation security. In this regard, the ATSA directs
the TSA to establish and undertake the security screening opera-
tions on a day-to-day basis at all passenger airports.10 3 To fulfill
this directive, the TSA is to hire, train, test and retain a sufficient
number of security screening personnel for placement in air-
ports throughout the United States. 10 4 The ATSA provides very
specific requirements for hiring qualifications, training and pro-
ficiency. °5 Included in the new hiring requirements is a direc-
97 The FAA has issued numerous Notices to Airman (NOTAMS) advising of air
defense identification zones. Particularly affected are three general aviation air-
ports around Washington, D.C., which have been completely shut down from
time to time since September 11, 2001. Even when reopened, operations were
significantly restricted and security protocols enhanced. See http://www.faa.gov
for information on current NOTAMS.
98 AOPA's Airport Watch, at http://www.aopa.org (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
99 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101; 49 U.S.C. § 114. The President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, appoints the Undersecretary of Transportation for
Security to run the new administrative agency. See supra note 73.
100 Pub. L. No. 107-296.
101 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101; 49 U.S.C. § 114(d).
102 Id.
103 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101; 49 U.S.C. § 114(e).
104 Id.
105 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 111; 49 U.S.C. § 44935.
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tive to conduct criminal background checks"°6  and an
expansion of the right to test for alcohol and controlled sub-
stances' 0 7on existing employees. Early on, some estimated that
tens of thousands of persons would need to be employed within
less than a year's time and that this hiring effort would be the
biggest federal organizational buildup of its kind since World
War 11.108
The TSA worked furiously over the past year to hire, train and
assign the tens of thousands of screeners needed to man 429
airports to meet the November 19, 2002 passenger screening
deadline and to meet the December 31, 2002 deadline to screen
all checked bags for bombs. Indeed, TSA hired more than
105,000 people since its inception, installed 1100 explosive pro-
tection systems and 5600 explosive trace detection machines in
429 airports. 109 Besides the usual concerns over hiring stan-
dards and training requirements, there have been and continue
to be political battles over funding and perceived unrealistic
deadlines." 0 While the most visible deadlines seem to have
been met, the funding battles continue.'11
Less successful has been the TSA's effort to jump-start the fed-
eral air marshals program. 12 With thousands of flights in the
United States each day, finding, training and deploying enough
qualified marshals and returning them to service has proved a
daunting task. ' 13
Upon adequately filling their hiring needs, the ATSA man-
dates that the TSA take over the screening of all passengers and
property, including mail, cargo, carry-on, and checked bag-
'or Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 138; 49 U.S.C. § 44936.
107 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 139.
108 Carol Hadden, TSA Launches Massive Workforce Buildup, AVIATION WEEK. &
SPACE TECH., July 15, 2002, at 46.
IN David Hughes, TSA Meets Goal With Casts of Thousands, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Jan. 6, 2003, at 35 (of the 105,000, 41,000 were temporary contrac-
tors, and 66,000 are new TSA employees).
110 Greg Sheider, Installation of Bomb Detectors Will Be Late at Some Airports; TSA's
Loy Opposes Lifting of Deadline in House Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2002, at A15.
I II See e.g., David Bond, Ed., Who Pays?, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 3,
2003, at 21 (diversion of airport improvement funds in Transportation budget to
cover the cost of some of the airport security equipment ordered by TSA); Air-
port Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has Affected Some
Development Projects, Oct. 15, 2002, at http://www.gao.gov/airptsec.html.
112 MSNBC, Air Marshals Program Hits Turbulence, at http://www.msnbc.com/
news/862756.asp?Ocv=CB20 (Jan. 23, 2003).
113 Id.
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gage.' 14 In connection with the screening of luggage, the TSA
had to deploy explosive detection systems or provide for
mandatory screening where the explosive detection systems are
not yet available." 5 Notwithstanding the obstacles faced, the
TSA substantially met the ATSA mandated deadlines. Of
course, new issues have arisen. For example, the rapid deploy-
ment forced by the congressionally mandated deadlines has
been criticized by some for diverting resources from what could
have been imaginative new solutions, rather than a massive de-
ployment of existing, and perhaps outdated, technology. 1 6 Re-
sponsibility for the loss of items from checked luggage remains
an area yet to be resolved. While the loss of or tampering with
checked luggage has historically been the responsibility of the
airlines, it is unclear who will take responsibility when items are
missing from checked luggage, the airline or the TSA.1 7 With
the initial efforts of the TSA on airline passenger and baggage
screening substantially completed, the focus has shifted to other
areas of the mandate. Particular attention is now being paid to
air cargo security with new rules currently in development."'8
Additional duties and powers of the TSA are to receive, assess,
and distribute intelligence information related to transportation
security; assess threats to transportation; develop policies and
strategies for dealing with threats to the transportation security;
plan and coordinate counter-measures to security risks with
other U.S. agencies; act as liaison with law enforcement and in-
telligence agencies; undertake day-to-day management of field
security; research and development of enhanced transportation
and security; implement and ensure adequacy of security mea-
sures at airports and other transportation facilities; and develop
extensive background checks for airport security screening per-
sonnel.' 19 Along these lines, the TSA recently announced its ef-
forts to develop the next generation of Computer Assisted
114 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 110; 49 U.S.C. § 44901.
115 Id.
116 David Hughes, TSA Meets Goal With Cast of Thousands, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Jan. 6, 2003, at 35.
117 David Hughes, Your Luggage Isn't Lost, Just Your Gold Necklace, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 11, 2002, at 37; see also, Shannon Buggs, Case of the
Missing Belt Reveals Baggage Fault Lines, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 16, 2003.
118 David Hughes, Security's Stepchild, A Sea of Change is Coming for Air Cargo Se-
curity, Including New TSA Requirements, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 31,
2003, at 50.
119 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101; 49 U.S.C. § 114(f).
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Passenger Pre-screening System. 2°  Known by the acronym
CAPPS II, this system seeks to enhance the ability of airline per-
sonnel and TSA screeners to identify a passenger's potential ter-
rorism related threat to aviation.
The ATSA grants the Undersecretary of the TSA the same au-
thority as the administrator of the FAA. 121 Included in these
powers is law enforcement power for airports and transportation
facilities. 122 The initial principal mission of the TSA is to assume
all civil aviation security functions in the United States. 12 With
this broad grant of power, the TSA continues to issue directives
it deems necessary to ensure security. On January 24, 2003 con-
troversial rules were issued affecting the rights of pilots.
24
These rules direct the FAA to immediately suspend, revoke or
refuse to issue an airman certificate to anyone the TSA deter-
mines poses a threat to air transportation security.
To date, there are no reported interpretations by the courts
of the authority granted to this new administration. However, it
would appear that Congress's intent was to create an agency
with the means and authority to expand the limited law enforce-
ment duties previously assigned to the FAA and to coordinate
and consolidate those duties with the security and law enforce-
ment duties of other government agencies. Accordingly, prior
cases and administrative rulings on transportation security and
law enforcement should be instructive as issues arise regarding
the implementation of the broad goals of the ATSA.
III. CONCLUSION
Now, more than a year and a half since the horrific attacks of
September 11, 2001, enormous strides have been taken to shore
120 Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA CAPPS H Gives
Equal Weight To Privacy, Security, at http://www.tsa.gov (Mar. 11, 2001).
121 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101; 49 U.S.C. § 114(m).
122 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101; 49 U.S.C. § 114(q).
123 Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(g).
124 Threat Assessments Regarding Citizens of the United States who Hold or Apply for
FAA Certificates, 68 Fed. Reg. 16, at 3756 (Jan. 24, 2003). Of particular concern
regarding the implementation of these new rules is the apparent lack of due
process protection resulting from the methodology employed by the rules. The
TSA is charged with determining whether a certificate holder may be a risk or
threat to security. The FAA's only role is to carry out the TSA's determination by
immediately revoking the certificate. Any appeal must occur within 15 days and
it is to the TSA. However, the TSA doesn't have to disclose the evidence against
the certificate holder if the TSA designates the determinative evidence as classi-
fied because its revelation would be contrary to the interest of national security.
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up a very lax aviation security system. Congress has taken
strong, serious, and unprecedented measures to create a perva-
sive air transportation security system. The measures imple-
mented by the TSA in passenger screening, baggage screening,
improvement of airport perimeter security, aviation industry
employee background screening and upgrades to cockpit secur-
ity, have immeasurably increased the difficulty for terrorists to
target airplanes for use as weapons of mass destruction.
But these measures create inconvenience and cost.125 The air-
lines continue to reel from the September 11 grounding and
the continued lack of confidence by many in the flying public
over the ability of the industry or government to prevent an-
other terrorist strike. Further, the inconvenience caused by
heightened security has resulted in many travelers exploring al-
ternative means of transportation. 126 Air travel remains down
despite the efforts of the federal government and the airlines to
restore confidence.1
27
Will Congress continue to fund this costly new system to pro-
vide not only the current level of security procedures, but to
develop new methods and technologies for anticipating and
combating future, as of yet unimagined, terrorism? What level
of security will pacify the public, and at what sacrifice to
convenience?
With the implementation of searches on all checked luggage
as of December 31, 2002, the TSA is in full swing. Many passen-
gers have said they are willing to endure inconvenience in ex-
change for some peace of mind. But how long will that
willingness last? In a country rightfully proud of our relative
freedom and ease of travel, do we have the social memory to stay
the course of heightened security? Only time will tell.
125 See e.g., James Ott, Tight Security Compels Airport Design Shake-up, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 18, 2002, at 48 (estimating at least $3-4 billion alone to
refit U.S. airports to make room for explosive detection systems in addition to a
like sum for the equipment).
126 JohnJ. Nance, Denial of Access: Hardening Our Defenses Against Terrorist Manip-
ulation of Commercial Aircraft, Sept. 28, 2001, CCH Issues In Aviation Law and
Policy.
127 Susan Casey, The Economy: Northwest Airlines Tells Workers It Must Overhaul
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